Michael E. Lyons, Individually; Denita L. Lyons, Individually; Michael E. Lyons and Denita L. Lyons, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Megan Renee Lyons, Deceased v. Richmond Community School Corporation d/b/a Richmond High School; Joe Spicer; Jeffrey Thorne; and Maggie LaRue, in Their Individual and Official Capacities; Indiana Insurance Company

Summary

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed summary judgment in a negligence and wrongful-death action arising from the choking death of a Richmond High School student with Down Syndrome. The Court held that factual issues remained regarding the Indiana Tort Claims Act notice requirement, including the discovery rule and active fraudulent concealment, and that the state-law claims were not ripe for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s rulings on the federal claims, third-party discovery, and proposed amendment to add the school’s insurer, and remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. Whether the Lyonses could, through ordinary diligence, have discovered the defendants' allegedly tortious conduct before the ITCA notice deadline presented unresolved factual issues and was not appropriate for summary judgment.
2. The evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants actively fraudulently concealed the Lyonses' potential claims; therefore, summary judgment was improper.
3. The alleged sources identified by the Lyonses did not establish a recognized legal duty requiring the school to disclose the incident to the parents, and the court declined to create a new duty based on in loco parentis, FERPA, or general public policy.
4. Summary judgment was inappropriate on the state-law negligence and wrongful-death claims because the defendants did not establish that the Lyonses' alleged negligence was so clear and palpable that no verdict could find otherwise.
5. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's rulings granting summary judgment on the federal claims, quashing the Lyonses' third-party discovery requests to Indiana Insurance, and denying leave to amend to add Indiana Insurance as a defendant.
6. ITCA notice compliance is a question of law for the court, but its resolution may depend on disputed facts; application of the discovery rule and fraudulent-concealment doctrine may involve factual questions for the factfinder.

Questions Presented

1. Whether material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the Lyonses' late Indiana Tort Claims Act notice could be excused under the discovery rule.
2. Whether material issues of fact precluded summary judgment based on active fraudulent concealment of the Lyonses' claims.
3. Whether the Lyonses established passive fraudulent concealment based on an alleged duty to disclose information about the incident.
4. Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence and wrongful-death claims based on the Lyonses' alleged contributory negligence.
5. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the federal claims, quashed third-party discovery directed to Indiana Insurance, and denied leave to amend to add Indiana Insurance as a defendant.
6. How the trial court should address the mixed questions of law and fact involved in the ITCA notice, discovery-rule, and fraudulent-concealment issues on remand.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded