Rogers v. Commonwealth

315 S.W.3d 303 (Ky. 2010) · Supreme Court of Kentucky · June 17, 2010 · No. 2008-SC-000915-MR

Summary

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Ray'mon Ja'kee Rogers's convictions for complicity to murder, complicity to attempted murder, and two counts of complicity to first-degree robbery. The court held that the trial court properly limited voir dire questioning concerning burdens of proof and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including the denial of directed verdicts.

Court
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Writing for the Court
Justice Venters; Chief Justice Minton; Justice Abramson; Justice Cunningham; Justice Noble; Justice Schroder; Justice Scott
Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Decision date
June 17, 2010
Docket number
2008-SC-000915-MR
Procedural posture
As a matter-of-right criminal appeal from a judgment entered after a jury convicted Rogers of complicity to murder, complicity to criminal attempt to commit murder, and two counts of complicity to first-degree robbery.
Standard of review
Restrictions on voir dire are reviewed for abuse of discretion. A directed-verdict claim is reviewed under whether, viewing the evidence and all fair and reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the court assumes the Commonwealth's evidence is true and leaves credibility and weight determinations to the jury.
Precedential value
Published Kentucky Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Ray'mon Ja'kee Rogers v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurejury selectionreasonable doubtburden of proofappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedureappellate litigationevidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel's voir dire inquiry comparing the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard with the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
  2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to deny a directed verdict on complicity to criminal attempt to commit murder of Hollister.
  3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to deny directed verdicts on the two counts of complicity to first-degree robbery.

Holdings

  1. A trial court may, subject to its sound discretion, permit counsel during voir dire to state in bare terms that beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard when the statement is used as the factual predicate for determining whether a prospective juror can apply the criminal standard. Counsel may not use voir dire merely to educate the jury on legal concepts. Because Rogers's counsel sought only to educate the venire and did not propose questioning jurors about possible inability or unwillingness to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the discussion.
  2. Rogers was not entitled to a directed verdict on complicity to criminal attempt to murder Hollister because the evidence, viewed favorably to the Commonwealth, supported reasonable inferences that Rogers and Bryant acted together and that Bryant's severe beating of Hollister was intended to kill him.
  3. Rogers was not entitled to directed verdicts on either count of complicity to first-degree robbery because the evidence supported reasonable inferences that Rogers and Bryant used force to accomplish the thefts and acted in concert, even though Rogers did not personally take all of the property or inflict all of the violence.

Key quotations

Accordingly, we agree that stating to the jury that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the same thing as the civil trial standard of "beyond a preponderance of the evidence" does not constitute defining reasonable doubt. (308)
Because our review of the record discloses that Appellant's sole purpose in raising the matter during voir dire was to educate the jury, rather than to elicit potentially disqualifying information about the jury, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it terminated counsel's discussion of the issue. (309)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed. (312)

Factual background

Rogers drove Marcus Pratt and James Hollister from Indiana to Kentucky with James Bryant, after Bryant had observed that Pratt possessed substantial cash and two cell phones. At an Elizabethtown location, Rogers and Bryant demanded that Pratt surrender everything he had; Rogers shot Pratt when Pratt attempted to flee, while Bryant severely beat Hollister into unconsciousness. Hollister's money and cell phone and Pratt's cash and cell phones were missing afterward, and Rogers was later observed with an unusually large amount of cash and a black cell phone.

Procedural history

Rogers was indicted in the Hardin Circuit Court, tried separately from codefendant James Bryant, and convicted on all four complicity charges. The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, an aggregate sentence of forty years' imprisonment in a judgment entered November 10, 2008. Rogers appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, challenging voir dire restrictions and the denial of directed verdicts.

Court Document

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