Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 266, section 14 permits only one aggravated-burglary conviction per dwelling, making the two Agawam convictions duplicative. The court vacated one Agawam conviction and dismissed the corresponding indictment. It affirmed the conviction on the amended Springfield indictment, concluding that changing the assault victim's name was a permissible amendment that did not violate article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or prejudice the defendant.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether two aggravated-burglary convictions under G. L. c. 266, § 14, based on multiple assaults and successive breaks within the same dwelling, were duplicative under double-jeopardy principles.
- Whether the amendment of the Springfield indictment to change the name of the assault victim violated art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or Mass. R. Crim. P. 4(d).
- Whether procedural waiver or direct estoppel barred the defendant from seeking postconviction relief from the duplicative conviction.
Holdings
- General Laws c. 266, § 14, permits only one aggravated-burglary conviction per dwelling. Once a dwelling has been broken into, subsequent breaks occurring within the dwelling and reasonably close in time and purpose are a continuation of the same offense, and multiple assaults on inhabitants cannot be aggregated into separate units of prosecution under § 14.
- The two Agawam convictions were duplicative because they arose from a single aggravated burglary of one dwelling, even though the defendant assaulted two different inhabitants and committed successive breaks inside the dwelling. One conviction had to be vacated, the verdict set aside, and the indictment dismissed.
- The amendment changing the assault victim's name from Carmella Goodrow to Sandra Goodrow did not violate art. 12 because the name of the assault victim was not an essential element of the § 14 offense where both indictments were based on the same burglary. The amendment changed form rather than substance.
- Waiver and direct-estoppel principles did not bar relief. Duplicative convictions pose a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice even when the sentences are concurrent.
Key quotations
“With respect to the Agawam indictments, we agree with the defendant that G. L c. 266, § 14 (§ 14), permits only one burglary conviction per dwelling and that the conviction on the duplicative indictment must be vacated.” (470 Mass. at 276)
“Our review of the common law suggests that multiple breaks of a single dwelling did not create distinct, punishable burglaries, but "were in law but one transaction."” (470 Mass. at 280)
“Once a person has broken and entered any part of the dwelling, at night, and with intent to commit a felony therein, the predicate offense of burglary as to that dwelling is complete.” (470 Mass. at 282)
“Because arming oneself with a dangerous weapon and assaulting the inhabitants of that dwelling merely aggravate that singular predicate offense, the Commonwealth may not aggregate such actions into multiple units of prosecution under § 14.” (470 Mass. at 282)
“The name of the assault victim was, therefore, not an essential element to the crime charged in this case. It follows, therefore, that the change was one of form rather than substance, and we detect no constitutional error in the conviction on the amended Springfield indictment.” (470 Mass. at 287)
Factual background
In June 1993, Bolden entered a Springfield dwelling, took property, and assaulted Sandra Goodrow. Several days later, he entered a dwelling in Agawam, assaulted Stanley Glogowski with a piece of lumber, and then assaulted Alice Glogowski while escaping. He was convicted of three aggravated-burglary counts under G. L. c. 266, § 14; the two Agawam counts were based on assaults of different inhabitants, and the Springfield indictment was amended before trial to identify Sandra rather than Carmella Goodrow as the assault victim.
Procedural history
Bolden was convicted in the Superior Court on seventeen indictments, including three aggravated-burglary indictments arising from burglaries in Agawam and Springfield. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. The Superior Court later denied his motion to correct illegal sentences; the Appeals Court affirmed in a rule 1:28 memorandum and order. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed as to one Agawam conviction and affirmed as to the other Agawam conviction and the Springfield conviction.
Remand instructions
No substantive remand was required for the Agawam convictions because the sentences were identical and concurrent. The judgment on indictment no. 93-1182 was vacated, the verdict was set aside, and the indictment was dismissed. The order denying postconviction relief was affirmed as to indictment nos. 93-1181 and 93-1183.