Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Jerry Meas’s convictions for murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm. The court rejected challenges to the form of the murder indictment, the admissibility of showup identifications, and the admission of surveillance videotapes after one camera recording was lost. The excerpt also addresses limits on cross-examination concerning witness bias and other alleged trial errors.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the murder indictment violated due process because it did not specify the theory of first-degree murder.
- Whether the prompt showup identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and violated due process.
- Whether the trial judge erred by admitting surveillance videotapes after police lost a recording from a third camera angle.
- Whether limiting cross-examination of a prosecution witness concerning possible bias violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
- Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by declining to discharge a juror exposed to a potentially extraneous incident involving a blue-painted rock.
- Whether the jury instruction concerning showup identifications was erroneous.
- Whether the trial judge was required to give a particular-care instruction concerning testimony given under an immunity agreement.
- Whether relief was warranted under the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's plenary review authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- A murder indictment in the statutory form prescribed by G. L. c. 277, § 79, is sufficient to charge murder in the first degree by any means or theory and does not violate due process merely because it does not specify the theory of murder.
- The showup identifications were not unnecessarily suggestive because the police had good reason to use a prompt one-on-one procedure under the circumstances, and the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the procedure violated due process.
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the remaining surveillance recordings after police lost the recording from a third camera angle because the defendant failed to show a reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence, that the lost recording would have been favorable, and he was able to use the loss to challenge the police investigation.
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by limiting further inquiry into a prosecution witness's possible bias after conducting a voir dire, allowing impeachment with relevant convictions, and finding that the claimed bias was speculative and sufficiently explored.
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by retaining a juror who reported that a rock bearing a light-blue paint mark had broken her husband's automobile window because the judge promptly conducted an individual voir dire and reasonably found that the incident did not affect the juror's impartiality.
- The showup-identification instruction was not erroneous because it accurately explained that a presentation of individuals one at a time is generally less reliable than a lineup or presentation of multiple similar individuals, and the defendant requested the instruction.
- The judge erred by failing to give the requested Ciampa particular-care instruction after an immunized witness testified pursuant to an agreement that included a promise to tell the truth, but the error was not prejudicial.
Key quotations
“Relevant to the good reason examination are the nature of the crime involved and corresponding concerns for public safety; the need for efficient police investigation in the immediate aftermath of a crime; and the usefulness of prompt confirmation of the accuracy of investigatory information, which, if in error, will release the police quickly to follow another track.” (at 441)
“A defendant who seeks relief from the loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence has the initial burden ... to establish a ‘reasonable possibility based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination that access to the [evidence] would have produced favorable evidence to his cause.’” (at 448)
“To guard against an implied representation of credibility, the judge must ‘specifically and forcefully tell the jury to study the witness’s credibility with particular care.’” (at 454-455)
Factual background
After a shooting outside a Lowell convenience store, police stopped a black Honda Accord matching the reported vehicle description and license-plate information approximately four to five blocks from the scene, within minutes of the shooting. The occupants were handcuffed and subjected to five prompt showup identification procedures; several witnesses identified Meas as the shooter, while others identified different occupants or made no identification. Police recovered a loaded firearm, ammunition, and cartridge casings associated with the shooting, and the firearm was linked through testing to recovered casings and a projectile. At trial, one of three surveillance-camera recordings was unavailable, and an immunized accomplice testified that Meas was the shooter.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Meas on December 16, 2008. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress identification evidence and admitted two surveillance videotape recordings despite the loss of a third camera angle. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the suppression order and convictions and declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.