Summary
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), which criminalizes certain electronic communications by adults with children concerning sexual conduct, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The court held that the statute covers some protected speech but is not substantially overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court reversed the lower courts’ dismissal of the communication charge.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- What is the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), including the phrases 'engaging in communication with a child,' 'intent to arouse,' and 'relating to or describing sexual conduct'?
- Does Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), regulate speech protected by the First Amendment?
- Is the statute facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech?
Holdings
- The phrase requires an adult to direct the prohibited electronic communication at a child. The statute does not reach nontargeted mass communications merely because a child may view them.
- The statutory requirement that the adult act with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of 'any person' applies according to its plain meaning and is not limited to the adult or child directly involved in the communication.
- The prohibited communication need not describe or relate to sexual conduct involving either the child or the adult participating in the communication; it may concern the sexual conduct of any person.
- The statute regulates some speech protected by the First Amendment, although much of the speech within its scope is unprotected because it is integral to criminal conduct, obscene, or child pornography.
- The statute is not substantially overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep and is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Key quotations
“We conclude that the statute is overbroad because it regulates some protected speech, and so we analyze whether that overbreadth is substantial.” (890 N.W.2d at 920)
“Given the relatively few protected communications that the statute regulates, we hold that Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), is not substantially overbroad.” (890 N.W.2d at 929)
“Based on our analysis, we hold that Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.” (890 N.W.2d at 929)
Factual background
Muccio, age 41, sent sexually explicit photographs and messages through Instagram and text messages to a 15-year-old boy. The communications included images of female nudity and messages describing sexual acts the two purportedly wanted to engage in. The State charged Muccio with felony communication with a child describing sexual conduct and felony possession of child pornography.
Procedural history
The State charged Muccio with felony communication with a child describing sexual conduct and felony possession of child pornography. The district court dismissed the communication count as facially overbroad under the First Amendment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.