Summary
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Gerald Stiffarm’s 2011 petition for post-conviction relief as procedurally barred under Montana law. The court also upheld the denial of his requests to withdraw his 2004 and 2006 guilty pleas and to obtain appointed counsel for the appeal. The court issued the decision as a noncitable memorandum opinion.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the District Court properly treated Stiffarm's 2008 motion as an original petition for postconviction relief and his 2011 filing as a second petition subject to the procedural bar in § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA.
- Whether the 2011 filing could be treated as an amendment to the previously denied 2008 petition.
- Whether Stiffarm established good cause under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, to withdraw his 2004 and 2006 guilty pleas.
- Whether the interests of justice required appointment of counsel for the appeal under § 46-21-201(2), MCA.
Holdings
- A filing challenging the legality of a sentence is properly treated as a petition for postconviction relief regardless of its title, and Stiffarm's 2011 petition was a second postconviction petition subject to the procedural bar because it did not raise grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition.
- The 2011 petition could not reasonably be treated as an amendment to the 2008 petition after the earlier petition had been denied as time-barred and legally insufficient.
- The District Court properly denied withdrawal of Stiffarm's 2004 and 2006 guilty pleas because he failed to demonstrate the statutory good cause required by § 46-16-105(2), MCA.
- The interests of justice did not require appointment of counsel for an appeal from a procedurally barred postconviction petition.
Key quotations
“this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent.” (¶1)
Factual background
Stiffarm pleaded guilty in 2004 to third-offense partner/family member assault and in 2006 to failure to register as a violent offender, with the latter charge based in part on the 2004 conviction. He later alleged that his 1993 PFMA conviction resulted from a guilty plea entered without counsel and therefore could not support the 2004 felony conviction. His 2011 postconviction petition also sought withdrawal of the 2004 and 2006 guilty pleas and appointment of counsel.
Procedural history
Stiffarm pleaded guilty to third-offense partner/family member assault in 2004 and failure to register as a violent offender in 2006. His 2008 motion challenging those convictions was treated as a petition for postconviction relief and denied as time-barred and legally insufficient; he did not appeal, although this Court later denied and dismissed his habeas petition. In 2011, he filed another postconviction petition alleging that a 1993 conviction was uncounseled and could not support the later felony conviction, and he sought to withdraw his 2004 and 2006 pleas. The District Court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred, denied plea withdrawal and appointment of counsel, and the Supreme Court affirmed.