Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed Yohan Webb’s claims that he was entitled to discharge because of violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights. The court held that Webb’s pretrial motions created an excludable period under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a), even though the motions were not specifically listed in the statute, and affirmed the statutory speedy-trial ruling. It dismissed the constitutional speedy-trial aspect of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the State proved that periods were excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4).
- Whether pretrial motions not specifically enumerated in § 29-1207(4)(a) qualify as excludable time for statutory speedy-trial purposes.
- Whether the absence of delay in the trial schedule prevents the period between filing and disposition of a defendant's pretrial motions from being excluded.
- Whether the Nebraska Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction to review a pretrial order denying discharge on constitutional speedy-trial grounds.
Holdings
- The State carried its burden of proving that Webb's August 5, 2019, pretrial motions created an excludable period under § 29-1207(4)(a), so the statutory speedy-trial clock stopped when the motions were filed.
- The pretrial motions listed in § 29-1207(4)(a) are examples rather than an exhaustive list; therefore, Webb's motions concerning disclosure, courtroom clothing and restraints, a Jackson v. Denno hearing, witness sequestration, and a motion in limine qualified as excludable pretrial motions.
- The court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review Webb's claim that he was entitled to absolute discharge on constitutional speedy-trial grounds because a pretrial order denying such relief does not affect a substantial right in a special proceeding under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1)(b).
Key quotations
“We again hold that the pretrial motions listed under § 29-1207(4)(a) are provided as examples and are not intended to be an exhaustive list.” (311 Neb. at 702)
“We therefore dismiss that aspect of Webb’s appeal.” (311 Neb. at 704)
Factual background
The State filed a criminal complaint against Webb on June 3, 2019. Webb filed multiple pretrial motions on August 5, 2019, including motions concerning other-acts evidence, impeachment evidence, courtroom clothing and restraints, a Jackson v. Denno hearing, witness sequestration, and a motion in limine; the motions remained pending. Webb was later found incompetent, restored to competency, obtained substitute counsel, sought a continuance, failed to appear for a pretrial conference, and was arrested on October 10, 2020. The courts determined that only 64 days of speedy-trial time had elapsed because the August 5 motions stopped the statutory speedy-trial clock.
Procedural history
The State filed a criminal complaint against Webb in Lancaster County Court on June 3, 2019. The county court denied Webb's motion for absolute discharge, concluding that his pretrial motions excluded time from the statutory speedy-trial calculation and denying his constitutional speedy-trial claim. The Lancaster County District Court affirmed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the statutory speedy-trial ruling but dismissed the constitutional speedy-trial portion of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.