Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 90-day substitution period under NRCP 25(a)(1) begins when a suggestion of death is filed on the record and served, rather than on the date of the deceased party’s death. The court nevertheless affirmed dismissal because the motions filed within the period did not identify a proper substitute party under NRS 41.100.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the 90-day substitution period under NRCP 25(a)(1) begins upon the deceased party's actual date of death or upon service of a suggestion of death on the record.
- Whether the motions filed by Gonor's attorney timely sought substitution of a proper party under NRS 41.100.
- Whether the district court's dismissal should be affirmed because it reached the correct result for a different reason.
Holdings
- The 90-day period under NRCP 25(a)(1) begins when a suggestion of death is filed on the record and served as required by the rule, not when the party actually dies.
- The proper party to substitute for a deceased plaintiff in a survival action is the decedent's executor or administrator, including a court-appointed special administrator; the estate itself is not a proper party.
- Dismissal was proper because the appellants failed to timely seek substitution of the proper party, even though the district court incorrectly held that the 90-day period began on Gonor's actual date of death.
Key quotations
“We hold that the latter triggers the 90-day limitation period.” (at 724)
“A plain reading of NRCP 25(a)(1) mandates that the suggestion of death be filed on the record in order to trigger the 90-day period.” (at 725)
“An "executor" is defined as "a person nominated in a will and appointed by the court to execute the provisions of the will and administer the estate of the decedent."” (at 726)
“Problematically, an estate is not a proper party; rather, the administrator of the estate must be named in the complaint.” (at 726)
Factual background
Irwin Gonor brought an intentional-interference action and died intestate on June 2, 2016, leaving his mother, Shirley Hoffner, as his sole heir. Defendants filed and served a suggestion of death on October 26, 2016. Gonor's attorney filed motions within the ensuing 90-day period, but the first sought to substitute Hoffner before a special administrator had been appointed and the second sought to substitute the estate itself. A special administrator was not appointed until after the 90-day period expired.
Procedural history
Irwin Gonor filed the underlying action and died during its pendency. After defendants filed and served a suggestion of death, Gonor's attorney filed motions seeking to substitute Gonor's mother, and later the estate, as plaintiff. The district court dismissed the action, first reasoning that the 90-day period ran from Gonor's actual death and later affirming dismissal with prejudice. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court used the wrong trigger date but affirmed because the motions did not timely identify and seek substitution of a proper party under NRS 41.100.