Summary
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 2007 reorganization of the criminal sexual penetration statute did not repeal or eliminate the mandatory life-sentence enhancement for a second conviction of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree. The Court construed the relevant statutes harmoniously, concluding that the statutory reference to the renumbered subsection was a clerical anomaly rather than an intended repeal.
Holdings
- The 2007 reorganization and subsequent amendment of Section 30-9-11 did not effectively repeal Section 31-18-25(F)(2). A second conviction for second-degree criminal sexual penetration remains a violent sexual offense eligible for the mandatory life sentence under Section 31-18-25(A).
Questions Presented
- Whether the 2007 reorganization of NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11, which moved the definition of second-degree criminal sexual penetration from Subsection D to Subsection E, eliminated the authority to impose the mandatory life sentence for a second conviction of second-degree criminal sexual penetration under Section 31-18-25.
- Whether Sections 31-18-25 and 30-9-11 should be construed harmoniously to give effect to the Legislature's intent despite the incorrect subsection reference in Section 31-18-25(F)(2).
Disposition
writ_granted
Cases Cited (6)
- State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 19, 21-22, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022(followed)
- Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047(followed)
- State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352(followed)
- State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896(acknowledged)
- State v. Sparks, 1985-NMCA-004, ¶ 49, 102 N.M. 317, 694 P.2d 1382(acknowledged)
- State v. Herrera, 1974-NMSC-037, ¶ 6, 86 N.M. 224, 522 P.2d 76(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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