Summary
The Oregon Supreme Court held that a trial court generally may not vacate and reenter an identical judgment solely to extend the statutory time for appeal when a party missed the deadline because of lack of notice or misadvice about entry of judgment. The court concluded, however, that the trial court could reenter the contempt judgment under ORCP 71 B(1)(a) because the original judgment was entered prematurely without the required service of the proposed judgment, depriving the mother of a procedural opportunity to object. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure altered the rule that a trial court may not vacate and reenter an identical judgment solely to extend the time for appeal.
- Whether the trial court had authority under ORCP 71 B(1)(a) or its inherent authority to reenter the judgment because the State failed to serve mother's counsel with the proposed judgment before entry.
- Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over mother's timely appeal from the amended judgment.
Holdings
- A trial court is not authorized to vacate a properly entered judgment and reenter an identical judgment solely to trigger a new appeal period when the party failed to timely appeal because of lack of notice or misadvice about entry of judgment rather than personally checking the record.
- A trial court may exercise discretion under ORCP 71 B(1)(a) to reenter a judgment when the original judgment was entered prematurely because the opposing party was not served with the proposed judgment and consequently was denied a required opportunity to object to its form before entry.
- Because the trial court had authority to reenter the judgment on the basis of the failure to serve the proposed judgment, mother's timely appeal from the amended judgment invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Key quotations
“In that circumstance, a trial court is not authorized to vacate the original judgment and reenter an identical one solely to trigger a new period in which the party may appeal the judgment.” (346 Or. at 537)
“That additional ground for the trial court's ruling distinguishes this case from Far West and brings it, instead, within this court's holding in Stevenson v. U.S. National Bank, 296 Or. 495, 677 P.2d 696 (1984).” (346 Or. at 539)
Factual background
Administrative orders required Jan Ainsworth to pay child support, and the State initiated a remedial contempt proceeding after she missed payments. The trial court found her in contempt and entered a judgment requiring ongoing support payments and an additional payment toward arrearages. Mother's counsel did not receive a service copy of the proposed judgment as required by UTCR 5.100(1)(a), and the clerk also failed to provide notice of entry; after the appeal period expired, the trial court entered an identical amended judgment.
Procedural history
The trial court found mother in remedial contempt for failing to pay child support and entered judgment on August 25, 2005. After mother failed to appeal within 30 days, the trial court entered an identical amended judgment after finding that mother had not received a required service copy of the proposed judgment; mother timely appealed from the amended judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The order of the Oregon Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.