Summary
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that Denise Jackson take nothing on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Creditwatch, Inc. and Harold E. Quant. The court held that the claim was unavailable because the alleged conduct was covered by other statutory remedies and, independently, that the alleged post-termination conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support the tort.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Jackson could pursue an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for conduct covered by other statutory remedies.
- Whether the alleged post-termination conduct, including refusal to provide references, a company policy restricting contact with former employees, and the alleged orchestrated eviction, was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
- Whether the alleged post-termination conduct could support liability notwithstanding the limitations on recovery of mental anguish damages under more established legal theories.
Holdings
- Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a gap-filler tort and may not be asserted when the plaintiff's complaints are covered by other statutory remedies, even if those remedies are unavailable because of limitations or other procedural bars.
- Refusing to provide a reference, declining to take reference calls during business hours, circulating a general policy forbidding employees from contacting former employees, and allegedly pressuring a coworker to evict the plaintiff were legally insufficient to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- Intentional infliction of emotional distress may not be used to circumvent limitations on mental anguish damages under more established tort doctrines.
Key quotations
“intentional infliction of emotional distress is a "gap-filler" tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.” (816)
“It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, and such claims are submitted to a jury only when reasonable minds may differ.” (817)
“Intentional infliction claims cannot be used "to circumvent the limitations placed on the recovery of mental anguish damages under more established tort doctrines."” (818)
“This tort was never intended as an easier and broader way to pursue claims already protected by our expanding civil and criminal laws.” (818)
Factual background
Denise Jackson alleged that Creditwatch chief executive officer Harold E. Quant made lewd sexual advances and retaliated against her after she refused them. After her termination, she alleged that Quant refused to provide a reference, that employees declined to take reference calls during business hours, that the company circulated a policy prohibiting contact with former employees, and that Quant pressured Jackson's landlord and coworker, Terri Blevins, to evict her. The Supreme Court assumed the alleged post-termination conduct occurred but held that it was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Procedural history
Jackson initially asserted claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and later withdrew them after defendants moved for summary judgment based on limitations. Her amended complaint asserted only intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual advances and alleged retaliation. The trial court granted summary judgment; the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part; the Texas Supreme Court reversed the portion remanding the post-termination claims and rendered judgment for defendants.