Rev Gerald Kiner v. Shelby County Government, Veronica Brown, in her official capacity and individual capacity, and Terrice May

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee grants Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in a case alleging First Amendment retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and breach of contract. The court dismisses the § 1983 claims with prejudice, finding that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between his protected speech and the alleged adverse actions, and dismisses the breach-of-contract claim without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Holdings

1. Plaintiff plausibly alleged protected speech and adverse action, but failed to plausibly allege a causal link showing that Brown or May acted in response to that speech. The First Amendment retaliation claims against Brown and May were therefore dismissed.
2. Brown and May were entitled to dismissal of the individual-capacity claims because Plaintiff did not plausibly allege that either defendant violated his First Amendment rights.
3. Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim because he alleged only a single incident involving his own contract and did not plausibly allege an unconstitutional County policy or custom that caused his injury.
4. The official-capacity claims against Brown and May were dismissed as redundant of the claims against Shelby County.
5. After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining breach-of-contract claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Plaintiff plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brown and May in their individual capacities.
2. Whether Brown and May were entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that they took adverse action because of his protected speech.
3. Whether Plaintiff plausibly alleged municipal liability against Shelby County under Monell.
4. Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law breach-of-contract claim after dismissing all federal claims.
5. Whether Plaintiff stated a separate equal-protection claim.

Disposition

dismissed