Kenneth E. Selvage v. Israel Hamilton et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia partially grants and partially denies defendants’ motion to dismiss claims arising from a prison disciplinary proceeding. The court dismisses without prejudice the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and due process claims against two defendants, while allowing First Amendment claims and certain due process claims to proceed. The court dismisses with prejudice the request for restoration of good-time credits, monetary damages associated with due process claims, and official-capacity monetary damages.

Holdings

1. The complaint plausibly alleged that the two-year suspension of all visitation and telephone privileges, imposed for a first drug-related disciplinary conviction, may lack a reasonable relationship to legitimate penological interests or may constitute an exaggerated response. Dismissal of the First Amendment claim was therefore premature.
2. The court declined to resolve qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the constitutional validity of the restriction could not be determined without a factual record.
3. Selvage failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because the loss of visitation, telephone privileges, good-time credits, increased security classification, and a $25 fine were not alleged to be sufficiently serious deprivations or to involve deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.
4. The failure to identify the testing officer in the initial disciplinary report, and Nichols's approval of the report, did not state a due process violation where Selvage received written notice of the charges and an opportunity to request witnesses.
5. A § 1983 action seeking restoration of good-time credits is barred when success would affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence and the disciplinary conviction has not been invalidated; the proper federal remedy is habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
6. Selvage's claims for monetary damages based on alleged due process defects in the disciplinary proceedings were barred by Heck and Edwards because success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction and loss of good-time credits.
7. Claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and were dismissed.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the alleged two-year suspension of visitation and telephone privileges plausibly violated the First Amendment under Turner v. Safley.
2. Whether the disciplinary sanctions alleged by Selvage constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
3. Whether failure to identify the testing officer in the disciplinary report and approval of that report violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Whether a § 1983 action may seek restoration of good-time credits when the disciplinary conviction has not been invalidated.
5. Whether monetary damages associated with due process challenges to the disciplinary conviction are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and Edwards v. Balisok.
6. Whether monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Disposition

other