Summary
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a post-conviction court’s determination that Debra Brown was factually innocent of the murder of Lael Brown. The court held that Utah’s Post-Conviction Remedies Act permits a factual-innocence determination to rely on both newly discovered and previously available evidence, provided newly discovered evidence contributes to the basis for the determination. The court also affirmed because the State did not properly challenge the post-conviction court’s factual findings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Part 4 of Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act permits a factual-innocence determination to be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence.
- Whether the post-conviction court's factual-innocence determination should be affirmed where the State did not properly challenge the court's factual findings.
- Whether the court should reach Brown's cross-appeal concerning summary judgment on her Part 1 post-conviction claims and the constitutionality of the PCRA statute of limitations.
Holdings
- The plain language of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act permits a court to determine factual innocence based on all available evidence, including a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence, so long as the statutory threshold for obtaining a hearing is satisfied.
- The factual-innocence determination must be affirmed because the State did not properly challenge the post-conviction court's factual findings that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon and that Brown's whereabouts were established during the remaining relevant period; accepting those findings, Brown necessarily established factual innocence under the governing statutory standard.
Key quotations
“Instead, the plain language of section 404 provides only one clear directive: a court shall base its determination of factual innocence on a consideration of “all the evidence”—old and new.” (¶ 50)
“We therefore hold that, under the plain language of the PCRA, the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that a determination of factual innocence can be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence.” (¶ 54)
“Once these facts are accepted, as they must be in light of the State’s concession, they lead inevitably to the conclusion that Ms. Brown did not murder Lael and is factually innocent.” (¶ 64)
Factual background
Debra Brown was convicted in 1995 of murdering her longtime employer, Lael Brown, based largely on circumstantial evidence concerning access to his home, a missing firearm and financial records, alleged forged checks, and a gap in her alibi on Saturday morning. Years later, newly developed evidence included testimony that Lael had been seen alive on Saturday afternoon and evidence undermining the State's theories concerning the time of death, access, motive, and other suspects. The post-conviction court found by clear and convincing evidence that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon and that Brown's whereabouts were established during the remaining period in which the murder could have occurred.
Procedural history
Brown was convicted of aggravated murder in 1995, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal in 1997. In 2009 she filed claims under Part 1 of Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act and a petition for a factual-innocence determination under Part 4. The post-conviction court granted the State summary judgment on the Part 1 claims, later held evidentiary hearings on the factual-innocence petition, determined by clear and convincing evidence that Brown was factually innocent, and vacated her conviction. The State appealed, and Brown cross-appealed the Part 1 summary judgment ruling.