Bishop v. Miche

Bishop v. Miche, 137 Wash. 2d 518 (1999) · Supreme Court of Washington · March 25, 1999

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court considered whether a county probation officer owed a duty to protect third parties from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by a probationer's dangerous propensities, and whether quasi-judicial immunity barred liability. The court held that the county probation officer owed such a duty and that quasi-judicial immunity did not categorically preclude negligent-supervision liability. Nevertheless, the court held that the probation judge's intervening decision not to revoke probation broke proximate causation as a matter of law and affirmed summary judgment for King County.

Holdings

  1. A county probation officer may owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to control a probationer and prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to others resulting from the probationer's dangerous propensities. A custodial relationship or power to arrest is not required.
  2. Quasi-judicial immunity does not categorically preclude liability for a county probation officer's negligent failure to adequately monitor and report probation violations. It does protect sentencing decisions and negligence based on the officer's failure to challenge fraudulent representations made to the sentencing court.
  3. Summary judgment for King County was proper because proximate cause was lacking as a matter of law. The district court judge's decision not to revoke Miche's probation after learning of his violation, alcohol problem, and need for treatment broke the causal connection between any negligent supervision and the fatal accident.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a county probation officer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others from reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from a probationer's dangerous propensities under the rule of Taggart v. State.
  2. Whether quasi-judicial immunity precludes liability for negligent supervision by a county probation officer.
  3. Whether summary judgment was proper because any negligent supervision by the probation officer could not, as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of the accident.

Disposition

reversed

Cases Cited (18)

  • Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992)(followed and reaffirmed)
  • Honcoop v. State, 111 Wn.2d 182, 193, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988)(followed)
  • Sherman v. State, 128 Wn.2d 164, 183, 905 P.2d 355 (1995)(followed)
  • Savage v. State, 127 Wn.2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995)(followed)
  • Plotkin v. State, 64 Wn. App. 373, 826 P.2d 221 (1992)(distinguished and limited)
  • A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988)(followed by analogy)
  • Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984)(followed by analogy)
  • Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986)(followed by analogy)
  • Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992)(not independently treated)
  • McKenna v. Edwards, 65 Wn. App. 905, 916, 830 P.2d 385 (1992)(distinguished)

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