Summary
The Washington Supreme Court held that the Pinkerton doctrine does not apply under Washington law to impose liability for substantive crimes committed by coconspirators. The court concluded that the jury instructions improperly permitted conviction without requiring proof that Stein had knowledge of the specific crimes, an essential element of accomplice liability. Because the jury may have relied on the erroneous conspiracy-based theory, the court found the error prejudicial and remanded for a new trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Stein could challenge the unobjected-to jury instructions as manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3).
- Whether Washington law permits conviction for substantive crimes committed by coconspirators under the Pinkerton doctrine without proof of the accomplice-liability requirement that the defendant know the specific crime will be promoted or facilitated.
- Whether the instructional error was harmless because the jury was also instructed on a legally valid accomplice-liability theory and the State presented substantial evidence under that theory.
Holdings
- The instructional error was manifest and of constitutional magnitude because the instructions potentially allowed the jury to convict Stein without finding an essential element of the charged crimes, thereby relieving the State of its burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Pinkerton doctrine is incompatible with Washington law and does not permit conviction for substantive crimes committed by coconspirators merely because those crimes were reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- The instructional error was not harmless, and Stein's convictions must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Key quotations
“In Washington, the conspiracy statute (RCW 9A.28.040(1)) predicates liability on the accomplice liability statute. Knowledge of the particular crime committed is an essential element of accomplice liability. Absent that knowledge, Washington law does not allow conviction for crimes committed by coconspirators, whether or not they are foreseeable.” (248)
“Thus, the Pinkerton doctrine is inapplicable to Washington law.” (248)
Factual background
John Kenneth Stein, who had severe paranoid delusions after serious head trauma, believed that people were depriving him of an inheritance from his father. He asked his stepson Michael Norberg to arrange accidents for targeted individuals and offered $10,000 for each person eliminated. Thelma Lund was killed, and three attempts were made to kill or intimidate attorney Ned Hall; Stein paid Norberg $2,000 after being told Hall had been killed, but the money was returned when Hall was found alive. Stein was convicted of crimes relating to Hall under jury instructions permitting liability based on the reasonably foreseeable acts of coconspirators without requiring proof that Stein knew of the specific attempted murders.
Procedural history
After a mistrial, Stein was retried and acquitted of conspiracy and the murder charges relating to Lund but convicted of burglary and three attempted murders relating to Hall under alternative accomplice- and conspiracy-based vicarious-liability theories. He received a 540-month sentence. His appeal was dismissed for failure to perfect it, but a federal district court later ordered reinstatement based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and due-process concerns from the delay. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeal with a personal restraint petition, reversed, and remanded; the Supreme Court affirmed that result on different grounds and ordered a new trial.
Remand instructions
Remand for a new trial. The trial court may consider, in its discretion, whether further relief is appropriate under CrR 8.3 or other theories raised in Stein's cross-petition.