State v. Wright, 165 Wash. 2d 783

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the defendants for second degree intentional murder after their second degree felony murder convictions were vacated. The convictions had been reversed because assault could not serve as the predicate felony under the applicable felony murder statute, rather than for insufficient evidence. The court also held that the juries’ general verdicts and failure to receive instructions on the intentional murder alternative did not constitute an express or implied acquittal of that alternative.

Holdings

1. The convictions were reversed because the State proceeded under an invalid legal theory or nonexistent crime, not because the evidence was insufficient. Retrial therefore was not barred by double jeopardy.
2. The defendants were not impliedly acquitted of second degree intentional murder because the juries were not instructed on that alternative and therefore had no opportunity to resolve the defendants' factual guilt or innocence on it.
3. The discharge of the juries without an express verdict on the intentional-murder alternative did not terminate jeopardy because the defendants were tried for one offense, second degree murder, and received a valid general verdict on that offense under the alternative-means doctrine.
4. The State may retry the defendants for second degree murder under the intentional-murder alternative. The defendants' continuing jeopardy on the single offense of second degree murder encompasses any valid alternative means of committing that offense.

Questions Presented

1. Whether reversal and vacation of the defendants' second degree felony-murder convictions because assault was not a legally valid predicate felony constituted reversal for insufficient evidence or instead trial error permitting retrial.
2. Whether the defendants were impliedly acquitted of second degree intentional murder when their juries were instructed only on the felony-murder alternative and returned general verdicts.
3. Whether jeopardy terminated when the juries were discharged without returning express verdicts on the intentional-murder alternative and without the defendants' consent.
4. Whether the State could retry the defendants for second degree murder under the intentional-murder alternative.

Disposition

affirmed