Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed Linda Calonico’s conviction for first-degree larceny based on the wrongful taking of approximately $800,000 from an elderly victim. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish the victim’s lack of knowing consent due to mental incapacity and the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the victim of her property, and it declined to reconsider the waiver rule because the state’s evidence alone was sufficient.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence presented during the state's case-in-chief was sufficient to prove first-degree larceny beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether the victim's mental incapacity could establish the lack of knowing and voluntary consent necessary to make the taking wrongful under Connecticut's larceny statutes.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended permanently to deprive the victim of her property.
- Whether the Supreme Court should abandon Connecticut's waiver rule, under which a defendant who presents evidence after denial of a motion for acquittal waives appellate review limited to the state's case.
Holdings
- The state's evidence, viewed under the applicable sufficiency standard, was sufficient to allow the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed first-degree larceny.
- Although mental capacity is not itself an express statutory element of larceny, a victim's mental incapacity may establish that the victim did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the taking, thereby making the taking wrongful.
- The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended permanently to deprive the victim of her assets.
- The court declined to decide whether to abandon the waiver rule because the state's evidence alone was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Key quotations
“Although neither § 53a-122 (a) (2) nor § 53a-119 specifically enumerates lack of consent as an element of larceny in the first degree, we agree with New York’s interpretation of N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05 (1), a larceny statute containing language similar to that of § 53a-119, that “a donative victim’s inability to consent to [a] taking [is a factor] . . . properly considered in the context of a traditional understanding of the larceny statute . . . .”” (at 153)
“The defendant’s intent to deprive the victim of her assets was demonstrated, not only by the victim’s obvious inability to consent to the transfers, but also by the lengths to which the defendant had gone to gain control over the victim’s assets and appropriate them for her own permanent use.” (at 162-63)
Factual background
The victim was an elderly, childless widow who suffered cognitive deterioration, including dementia and a probable stroke, and required professional assistance with her finances. Over approximately three weeks, the defendant consolidated the victim's assets and transferred or withdrew nearly $800,000 into accounts belonging to the defendant, her family, and associates, while isolating the victim from attorneys and protective-services personnel. The evidence included professional observations of the victim's incapacity, suspicious bank transactions, the defendant's control over the victim's financial affairs, and efforts to use the victim's assets for the defendant's own benefit.
Procedural history
The trial court found that the defendant had wrongfully obtained approximately $800,000 from an elderly victim who lacked the mental capacity to consent and sentenced her accordingly. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that Connecticut should abandon the waiver rule governing review after a defendant presents evidence following denial of a motion for acquittal, and contended that the state failed to prove lack of consent and intent permanently to deprive. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the state's evidence alone was sufficient and therefore declining to reconsider the waiver rule.