In the Interest of J.F.C., A.B.C., and M.B.C., Minor Children

Summary

The Texas Supreme Court reviewed a parental-rights termination judgment involving three minor children. It held that although the jury charge omitted the children's best-interest requirement in material respects, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 supplied an express or deemed finding supporting termination, and the omission did not constitute reversible fundamental error or violate due process. The court also addressed clear-and-convincing-evidence standards of appellate review and ineffective assistance of counsel, reversed the court of appeals, and rendered judgment terminating the parent-child relationships.

Holdings

1. Although the jury charge was erroneous because it omitted the children's best interest as a prerequisite for termination in material portions, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 required the omitted finding to be supplied because the trial court made an express finding, or alternatively a deemed finding existed, that termination was in the children's best interest.
2. The concept of fundamental error cannot be used to circumvent Rule 279 when a party fails to object to the omission of an element of a claim from the jury charge.
3. Applying Rule 279 to deem a supported best-interest finding in a parental-termination case does not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution.
4. In parental-termination cases, legal sufficiency review must determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations, rather than applying the traditional any-scintilla standard.
5. The court did not reach the parents' constitutional challenge to the broad-form submission because the evidence conclusively established that each parent engaged in conduct described by Texas Family Code section 161.001(1)(O), making any alleged submission error harmless.
6. Assuming without deciding that ineffective assistance could provide a basis for setting aside a parental-termination judgment, the parents did not establish ineffective assistance under the stringent Strickland standard.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the omission of the children's best-interest requirement from material portions of the jury charge required reversal when the parents did not object.
2. Whether Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 required the omitted best-interest finding to be supplied as an express or deemed finding supporting the judgment.
3. Whether applying Rule 279 to supply the omitted finding violated federal due process or the Texas Constitution's due course of law provision.
4. Whether the broad-form submission failed to require the same ten jurors to agree on a statutory predicate ground and the children's best interest.
5. Whether the parents could obtain a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
6. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding and whether the parents' other evidentiary and sufficiency complaints required reversal.

Disposition

reversed